(Abstract) While asset impairment reversals are practiced in many jurisdictions, empirical evidence is rather limited. China provides us with a unique opportunity to examine both the determinants and consequences of impairment reversals due to its recent developments in standard-setting. Based on a sample of reversal firms in China, we find the following: First, although economic factors and reporting incentives both explain reversals, reporting incentives dominate. Second, while total reversals provide investors with useful information, the price-earnings multiples of this information are significantly weaker as compared to other income statement components. Finally and more importantly, we find that the valuation consequence of reversals, if unrealized, disappears completely. Taken together, we conclude that managerial opportunism may have reduced the reliability of otherwise value-relevant reversal information. While the intention of granting discretion in impairment reversal is for management to communicate private value recovery information, our findings suggest that a seemingly improved accounting standard does not necessarily lead to its intended consequence in financial reporting.
I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines the determinants and consequences of asset impairment reversals by exploring a unique research setting in China. The study is motivated by the following two factors. First, the recent accounting developments in China provides us with a rare opportunity to shed light on whether according managerial discretion improves the quality of accounting information or induces opportunistic behavior. This is a particularly timely issue considering that regulators across the world strive to improve accounting standards to ensure the growth of securities markets. Second, although asset impairment reversals are widely practiced in different jurisdictions, our understanding based on empirical evidence is rather limited regarding what drives a company to report impairment reversals and what is the impact of such reversals on financial reporting quality.
Over the past decade, China has witnessed historic progress in the internationalization of its accounting standards, especially in the area of asset impairment. In1998, listed companies were required, for the first time, to recognize asset impairments for accounts receivable, inventories, and short-and long-term investments. By 2001, the recognition of asset impairments has extended to fixed assets, construction in progress, intangible assets, and commission loans. Although the intention of these reforms is to improve the quality of accounting information, in particular by correcting the overstated balance sheets, 1 the new impairment standards lead to much more discretion for management than before. The Chinese developments are not isolated; rather they reflect an international trend in the area of asset (Insert Figure 1) Without doubt, regulators around the world face this dilemma: Should management be allowed to communicate private information of impairment recovery or prohibited from doing so in order to minimize opportunistic behavior? This is a particularly important concern given that impairment reversals directly increase net income. Empirical evidence is needed to answer this question. Although there have been many studies on impairment recognition (e.g., Elliot and Shaw 1988; Zucca and Compbell 1992; Francis et al. 1996; Rees et al. 1996; Riedl 2004; and Yang et al. 2005) , there has been no published research on asset impairment reversals due to data constraint. While the disclosure of unrealized reversals is required under IAS, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a large reversal sample from notes to the financial statements. Further, the scattered note disclosures make it more difficult to enforce consistency among companies. As for realized reversals, disclosure practice varies even more. 2 In comparison, the disclosure of impairment reversals in China is both uniform and systematic. Out of the concern that impairment reversals may be used opportunistically for earnings management, the Chinese authority requires listed companies to disclose total reversals as part of the non-recurring income and unrealized reversals for each type of impaired assets in a separate asset write-down disclosure table.
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We manually collected the reversal information from annual reports over three years from 2003 to 2005. Averagely speaking, about 50 percent of listed firms in each year reverse asset write-downs made in previous years, which provides us with a sufficiently large sample for this study. Based on this unique reversal sample, we 2 Under neither IAS nor U.S. GAAP, the disclosure of realized reversals is dealt with in any of the asset impairment standards. Rather, such disclosure is implied as a disclosure for changes in accounting estimates. Consequently, practice varies substantially. For example, Keiso et al. (2007, p. 428 ) cites three companies including Vishay Technologies, Transwitch, and Cisco Systems to illustrate the variation in the disclosure of realized reversal of inventory write-downs. 3 While the Accounting System for Business Enterprises in 2001 explicitly granted reversal rights, detailed disclosure requirements were not available until 2003 when the Ministry of Finance issued "Questions and Answers No. 2: Implementing the 2001 Accounting System for Business Enterprises and Related Accounting Standards." According to this document, listed companies must disclose, in a separate table, two types of decreases in asset impairment provision accounts: (1) unrealized reversals due to the recovery of asset impairments, and (2) write-offs due to the disposal of assets. Realized reversals are part of the write-offs. The following year in 2004, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued "Questions and Answers No. 1: Disclosure Regulations -Non-recurring Items" and required listed companies to disclose the total reversals of asset impairments (both realized and unrealized) as a non-recurring item. The appendix contains an example of reversal disclosure obtained from the 2005 annual report of Beijing New Building Materials Public Limited Company listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The company recognizes a total reversal of RMB 2,308,406 as a non-recurring item and discloses an unrealized reversal of RMB 1,718,879 involving bad debts, inventories and fixed assets. While realized reversals are part of the "write-offs" column, the figure can be computed as the difference between the total and the unrealized reversals in this example.
report the following: First, while both economic factors and reporting incentives explain impairment reversals, reporting incentives dominate. Second, the total reversals of asset impairments provide investors with useful information, but the usefulness of this information is significantly less than other components in the income statement. Third, and more importantly, when we focus on unrealized reversals, we find that the value-relevance of reversal information disappears completely. Our primary conclusions remain valid under various sensitivity tests.
Taken together, our results suggest that managerial opportunistic behaviors may have reduced the reliability of otherwise value-relevant reversal information. Overall these results are consistent with the mass media's negative attitude towards reversal.
4
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, our findings add another piece of evidence regarding earnings management through expense reversal in a more comprehensive manner including both determinants and consequences. To our knowledge, Moehrle (2002) is the only published study on expense reversal, which shows that U.S. companies reverse restructuring charges to meet or exceed analyst forecasts, and to avoid earnings declines or losses. Second, impairment reversals are an important type of accounting discretion available in jurisdictions that follow IAS/IFRS. Even for countries such as the U.S. that do no allow unrealized reversals, realized reversals exist through asset disposals.
Nonetheless, there has been virtually no empirical evidence on impairment reversals in general and unrealized reversals in particular. Our study is the first to provide such evidence. Third, this study contributes to the accrual-based earnings management literature through examining a group of identifiable accrual items, i.e., the reversal of asset write-downs. Relatively, our study is less subject to the measurement error associated with the use of the discretionary accrual estimation models (Dechow et al. 1995) . Finally, our findings shed light on the consequences of accounting standards in general and in emerging markets in particular. Regulators around the world face the dilemma of whether to grant more discretion so that managers can make the most appropriate accounting choice to reflect underlying economics. The development of asset impairment accounting in China provides an interesting experiment, the results of which suggest that a seemingly improved accounting standard may not necessarily accomplish its intention of improving financial reporting without the supporting infrastructure for constraining opportunistic earnings management.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a review of relevant literature and develops our research hypotheses. In the following section, we describe our reversal sample in detail. Sections four and five contain our primary tests of the determinants and consequences of impairment reversals.
Following the primary tests, we present a battery of sensitivity analysis. Finally, we conclude the paper with a summary of findings and implications for research and practice.
II. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS
Although there has been no research on impairment reversals, prior studies on asset impairment are relevant for the development of our hypotheses. Managerial discretion is a focal point in this literature. Management cannot communicate its private information about asset value to outside parties without necessary discretion;
however, such discretion also provides opportunities for earnings manipulation. A long standing emphasis in the literature is to examine whether asset write-downs are driven by underlying economics or reporting incentives for earnings management. A number of studies attempt to distinguish between the two perspectives solely based on market responses. If asset write-downs reflect the confidence of management in the future performance of the firm, investors should respond positively (Frantz 1999) . Strong and Meyer (1987) provide supporting evidence in that asset write-downs have a positive effect on stock prices. Similarly, Francis et al. (1996) find that the market responds positively to the announcement of restructuring charges. On the other hand, managers may write down assets even if they have unfavorable information about the future of the firm. Taking a big bath in the current period makes it more likely for earnings and managerial compensation to increase in the future (Frantz 1999) . Under this circumstance, asset write-down information is noisy, which explains why the market may not show any responses as reported by Zucca and Campbell (1992) or respond negatively as documented by Elliot and Shaw (1988) .
Other studies go beyond the valuation consequence of asset impairment. Rees et al. (1996) find that firms are more likely to write down assets when earnings are already low and that abnormal accruals are significantly negative in the write-down year, both of which suggest earnings manipulation. However, their follow-up tests show that these abnormal accruals are positively associated with stock returns and are not reversed during the years after the write-down, which contradicts the earnings management story. Francis et al. (1996) also report mixed evidence on the causes and valuation consequences of discretionary asset write-offs. While they find that both earnings management incentives and economic factors cause asset write-offs, reporting incentives play little role in determining inventory and PP&E write-offs but an important role in explaining more discretionary items such as restructuring charges. Easton et al. 1993; Aboody et al. 1999) examine upward asset revaluations allowed in countries such as Australia and the U.K., and conclude that these revaluations are likely reflecting increases in future cash flows as evaluated by investors. The conclusion is not surprising given that an upward revaluation is adjusted to equity without impact on current earnings. Because asset impairment reversals directly increase net income, it is more interesting to distinguish between underlying economics for reality and reporting incentives for earnings management.
As a priori, neither the economic reality nor the earnings management hypothesis can be ruled out. The original intention of the Chinese authority to comply with the IAS/IFRS standards on asset impairment accounting was to improve the quality of financial reporting. At least, two considerations support the economic reality hypothesis. First, with asset impairment standards, listed Chinese firms are required to correct the overstatement of assets on their balance sheets. Aharony et al. (2000) report that companies in China significantly overstate their assets to meet IPO requirements. With properly implemented asset impairment accounting, the financial statements should be more reflective of economic reality. As part of the asset impairment accounting, reversal discretion will further allow management to incorporate value recovery into the financial statements. Second, the reversal statistics in Table 1 seem to reveal patterns that are consistent with the underlying economics of different industries.
(Insert Table 1) The industry grouping is based on the 13 industry classification by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). As there are many manufacturing firms, we further divide the manufacturing into seven groups, resulting in a total of 19 industries sorted in a descending order by the mean reversal to total assets. As shown in the second column, the mean reversal of the real estate development industry is much higher than other industries, consistent with the recent property market boom in China. As reported in the third and fourth columns, industries with higher frequencies of reversals are those that employ more tangible assets such as electronics and civil engineering or those that experience frequent asset realizations such as wholesale and retail trade. On the other hand, intangible asset-intensive industries such as media and labor-intensive industries such as furniture manufacturing apparently have less frequent reversals. The fifth and sixth columns show the distribution of unrealized reversals by industry, which accounts for about half of the total reversals. The last four columns further reveal that metal manufacturing has the highest frequency of short-term asset impairment reversals, which is likely due to the larger amount of inventory in that industry. In comparison, the power, gas and water industry has the highest frequency of long-term asset impairment reversals, which is probably because of more reliance on fixed assets in this industry.
Support for the earnings management hypothesis can also be easily identified. As reviewed earlier, even in mature markets where asset impairment accounting has been practiced for many years, managers write down assets opportunistically to increase compensation, take a big-bath or smooth earnings (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004) . Accrual-based earnings management can be easily rationalized in the name of the company.
The cost of earnings management through asset impairment in China is relatively low. The detailed guidelines on asset impairment accounting lag behind practice; for example, the estimation of present value based on an asset group, comparable to the cash generating unit concept in IFRS, was not introduced until 2006. The lack of implementation guidance often results in management having access to accounting discretion not intended by accounting standards, making it more difficult for auditors to evaluate such discretion. Further, when the asset impairment standards were issued in 1998 and 2001, listed firms were allowed to adjust cumulative asset impairments to the beginning equity, which makes it less costly for the firm to create hidden reserves in one year and reverse write-downs in another. Finally, neither write-downs nor reversals have any tax implications in China. 6 Enhancing current earnings through impairment reversals will not bring about any additional tax costs.
To summarize, the quality of reversal information is dependent on motivation.
Reversals motivated by economic reality should be of high quality and provide useful information to investors, while reversals motivated by earnings management should be of low quality, therefore ignored by investors. We test our expectation through the following hypotheses:
H1: Consistent with the economic reality view, the reversals of asset impairment are associated with variables measuring underlying economics of asset value recovery, and the reversal information is priced by the stock market.
H2:
Consistent with the reporting incentive view, the reversals of asset impairment are associated with variables measuring reporting incentives for earnings management, and the reversal information is ignored by the stock market.
III. SAMPLE
Listed firms are required to disclose reversals systematically since 2003. Our sample is comprised of A-share listed companies in non-financial industries from 2003 to 2005. We manually collect reversal information from the annual reports. Over the three year period, there are 2,025 reversal observations. Since 209 observations disclose only unrealized reversals, we treat the unrealized as total reversals for these observations. Because of this, the amount of total reversals in our sample may have been underestimated. After excluding 137 observations with missing variables, we obtain 1,888 clean reversal observations, of which 897 explicitly disclose unrealized reversals. Our sampling process is shown in Panel A of Table 2 .
(Insert Table 2) Panel B of Table 2 Table 2 indicates that bad debt provisions and inventory write-downs are the two most frequently reversed items, while the reversals of long-term asset impairments are less frequent. In terms of median values, write-down reversals in intangible assets and constructions in progress have a larger impact on current earnings. Furthermore, we find substantial differences in the mean and median statistics of reversal magnitude, suggesting outliers in the sample. We winsorize each continuous variable by year at the top and bottom 1% and present outlier-adjusted descriptive statistics in Table 3 .
(Insert Table 3) Even with the winsorization, the maximum amount of reversals over total assets (RVTA) still reaches 5 percent, and the standard deviation is twice as large as the mean value. Apparently, some companies reported large amounts of asset write-down reversals during the sample period. We obtained market returns and stock prices from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Other research variables are mainly from the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database produced by GTA Information Technology. 7 Besides the scaled reversal variable, RVTA, the variables measuring underlying economics or reporting incentives will be described in the next section, and the variables used in our valuation models will be discussed in Section V.
Finally, we should note that, while there are 1,888 reversal observations in Panel A of Table 2 , the total sample of this study contains 2,817 firm/year observations including both reversal and non-reversal observations of companies that report at least one reversal item during the sample period. Assuming consistency in reversal disclosure, this time-series sample will help us distinguish between the economic reality and the earnings management hypothesis because the non-reversal year observations will serve as the benchmark for examining the determinants and the consequences of reversals. Based on the same principle, we employ a sample of 1,749 firm/year observations when examining unrealized reversals, although there are 897 unrealized reversal items disclosed over the three years period. (1) RVTA is impairment reversals divided by beginning total assets. β 1 to β 7 are the coefficients of seven economic factors measuring the likelihood of asset impairment recovery. INDROA, INDGROW, and INDMTA represent median changes from t-1 to t in industry returns on assets, sales growth, and market to asset ratios. They intend to capture industry-specific changes in the underlying economics. A larger measure suggests a promising prospect in this industry and a greater likelihood that a firm in this industry will recover from asset impairments. ΔSALES, ΔOCF, ΔMTA, and ΔMI measure firm-specific changes in asset value. While ΔSALES and ΔMTA are percentage changes in sales and market to asset ratio from t-1 to t, ΔCFO and ΔMI are changes in operating cash flows and main operating income divided by beginning total assets. 8 A larger value in these variables suggests a likelihood of recovery from asset impairments in this firm. According to our economic reality hypothesis (H1), we expect β 1 to β 7 to be significantly positive.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF IMPAIRMENT REVERSALS
β 8 to β 15 are the coefficients of reporting incentive variables. ST is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for companies whose stock codes carry a "special treatment" symbol in t-1due to two consecutive years of loss. AVST is another dummy variable with a value of 1 for companies reporting a loss in t-1 but in t-2. These two will be signified by a "*ST" and suspended from trading. A further loss in the following quarter will lead to delisting. An ST or AVST company will have a strong incentive to use reversals to avoid a continued loss in the current year.
MGT is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms having a new chairman or CEO from an external source in period t-1. 9 Previous studies show that incoming executives, especially those from external sources, tend to write down assets to increase the likelihood of performance improvement in the future (Strong and Meyer 1987; Francis et al. 1996) . New management may also use reversals to show an increase in earnings in period t to demonstrate its ability to improve firm performance.
operations, we use the change in main operating income to measure the degree of earnings improvement without reversals.
MOP is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a company receives a modified audit opinion with an explanation related to asset write-downs. A positive coefficient is expected for this variable because companies with problems in asset write-downs are more likely to use reversals opportunistically. BATH is another dummy variable equal to 1 if a company's asset write-downs in t-1 exceed the 75th percentile of its industry average. Since big-bath write-downs are more likely reversed, we expect a positive coefficient. LOSS, DEC, and FC measure incentives for avoiding loss, reducing earnings decline, and meeting analysts' forecasts. Moehrle (2002) shows the importance of these incentives for the reversal of restructuring charges in the U.S., and these three variables are defined in the same way as in Moehrle (2002). LOSS equals the absolute value of loss amount if a company reports a loss before reversal, and 0 otherwise; DEC equals the absolute value of earnings decline if a company reports a negative earnings change from t-1, and 0 otherwise; and FC is equals to 1 if earnings before reversal are below the median earnings forecast by financial analysts, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for debt ratio (LEV), firm size (SIZE), and industry differences. For simplicity, Table 4 presents Tobit regression results with the 18 industry dummies omitted.
(Insert Table 4) For the sample of total or unrealized reversals, we first present the results separately for economic factors or reporting incentives, and then combine them in a single regression. We observe four interesting findings from Table 4 . First, similar to the previous studies of asset impairments (Francis et al. 1996; Li 2001; Chen et al. 2004; Riedl 2004) , both economic factors and reporting incentives explain the choice as well as the magnitude of reversals, suggesting the co-existence of economic and reporting incentives for reversal decisions.
Second, the relative explanatory power of the economic variables is substantially lower than that of the reporting incentive variables. The economic factor regressions have much lower R-squares for either the total or the unrealized reversal samples.
While ΔOCF is highly significant for the total reversal, the level of significance drops to 9% for the unrealized reversal sample. ΔSALES is marginally significant at the 12% level in the unrealized reversal model, but insignificant in the total reversal regression. In contrast, the reporting incentive models show much stronger results:
The R-squares of both samples are substantially higher, and five out of the eight reporting incentive variables are significant as expected in each regression. An analysis of changes in R-squares from the economic factor model to the combined model further confirms the relative importance of reporting incentives. Adding the eight reporting incentive variables to the seven economic factors in the total reversal sample increases R-square by more than 9%, but adding the seven economic factors to the eight reporting incentive variables, we only observe an increase of less than 1%.
The results using the unrealized reversal sample demonstrate a very similar pattern in R-square changes. 
V. VALUATION CONSEQUENCES OF IMPAIRMENT REVERSALS
Overall, our tests of the determinants of impairment reversals appear to be more consistent with the earnings management (H2) rather than the economic reality (H1) hypothesis. This section further analyzes valuation consequences to complete our hypothesis testing. If reversals reflect a recovery of asset impairments in future cash flows, the reversal information should be positively related to stock valuation; whereas, if investors consider the reversals to be earnings management, one should observe no such an association. The valuation consequences of impairment reversals can be assessed using either a short-window event study or a long-window association study. Given that Chinese companies announce reversals through annual reports, the event study approach may be more affected by confounding information both in and outside an annual report. We turn to the value relevance literature in the Chinese stock we compare the magnitudes of β 1 , β 2 and β 3 based on joint F tests. According to Chinese GAAP, the reversals of bad debt and inventory write-downs are part of above-the-line recurring income, while other reversals are recognized as below-the-line items. When examining total reversals, we cannot identify different reversal items, and therefore we exclude the amount of total reversals from both the recurring income and the below-the-line items, which results in an understatement in both types of income. However, for the sample of unrealized reversals, we are able to clearly identify specific items of reversal, and thus the partition of net income into the three components is without any measurement error.
adjusted according to the White-test.
(Insert Table 5) We first estimate regular OLS regressions for the sample of total reversals. The coefficient of recurring income (β 1 ) is significantly positive in both the return and price models, but the coefficient of below-the-line items (β 2 ) is significant only in the return model. Further, β 1 is significantly larger than β 2 in both models, consistent with the expectation that recurring income is of higher value relevance than below-the-line items. The coefficient of reversals (β 3 ) is significantly positive in the return model, but insignificant in the price model. However, the magnitude of this coefficient seems out of proportion relative to β 1 and β 2 . A further check reveals that the standard deviation of this variable is substantially larger than the standard deviation of either the recurring income variable or the below-the-line items. 12 It appears that the results are affected by outliers even though the data have been winsorized. We employ the rank regression for a further analysis. 13 As shown in the third column of Table 5 , the rank regression improves R-squares in both models, and the standard deviations of different variables become comparable. The coefficients of all three earnings variables, β 1 , β 2 and β 3 are significantly positive in both models. The F tests of coefficient differences show that both (β 1 -β 2 ) and (β 2 -β 3 ) are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level, suggesting decreasing value relevance in the order of recurring income, below-the-line items, and reversals. In fact, the coefficient magnitude of reversal is substantially lower than below-the-line items in both models. Consequently, our tests based on total reversals suggest that, while the reversal information appears to be 12 The standard deviations of recurring income, below-the-line items, and reversals are 0.07, 0. To sum up, the valuation and persistence tests in this section, together with the results of the economic factor and reporting incentive model in the previous section, present a fairly consistent story regarding the determinants and consequences of impairment reversals in China. While we find some weak evidence of economic considerations, the dominance of reporting incentives in managerial reversal decisions apparently affects the reliability of reversal information in such a way that the usefulness of reversal information to investors is significantly reduced. Further, we find that, consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, reversals are significantly less persistent than either recurring income or below-the-line items.
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
This section analyzes the robustness of our main results. First, we change the sample by excluding consecutive reversals. Second, we use the event study approach.
Third, we investigate the difference among various items of unrealized reversals. 15 The OLS regression results are stronger in support of the earnings management hypothesis.
Fourth, we examine the effect of industry. Finally, we examine valuation consequences using a fixed effect model. Overall, all these robustness tests confirm our main findings.
Reduced Sample
Within our sample, there are companies that recognize impairment reversals for the three years consecutively. Two potential problems exist with these observations. First, they do not have their own non-reversal years as time-series benchmarks, and second, they may be different in some unknown aspects from other observations in the sample. Consequently, we re-run our tests based on a reduced sample after excluding these observations. The results of valuation consequence based on this reduced sample are also very similar to those reported in Table 5 . The total reversal variable is significantly positive in both models (OLS or rank regressions), but the variable becomes insignificant for unrealized reversals. Further, the persistence model also produces similar results.
While the reversal variable is significant for total reversals, there is no evidence of persistence for unrealized reversals.
Short-Window Tests
Within a short window, if a reversal announcement communicates information on asset value recovery not expected by the market, investors should respond positively;
on the other hand, if the reversal decision is driven by earnings management, we
should not observe such a wealth effect. Using the event study approach, we construct the following models: Both models test the short-term wealth effect of reversal decisions, where CAR is the cumulative amount of daily abnormal returns (AR). We use two methods to calculate AR: (1) the daily return of a sample company minus the market return of the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange Index, and (2) the abnormal return of a company based on the market model estimated over a 120-day window from day -150 to day -31. In both models, UNEPS is unexpected earnings per share measured as a change in earnings before reversals. OP is a dummy variable for audit opinions, which equals to 1 if a company receives a modified opinion. SIZE is the natural logarithm of ending total assets. The two models differ in how the reversal variable is measured. In Model (5), RPS is the amount of reversals per share, while in Model (6), URPS is the change of reversals per share. Since we measure changes in reversal, Model (6) Table 6) As shown in Table 6 , the results are fairly consistent no matter whether they are based on a one-day or a two-day window and how CAR is calculated. In both panels, β 1 is significantly positive, β 2 significantly negative, and β 3 insignificant. These results suggest that unexpected earnings are positively related to cumulative abnormal returns; a modified audit opinion has a negative wealth effect; and reversals have no valuation consequence.
Different Types of Impairment Reversals
Managerial discretion may vary among different types of impairment reversals.
For example, it is hard to find market prices for many firm specific long-term assets, and value recovery is estimated with more subjectivity than short-term assets such as short-term investments and inventory for which market indicators are more readily available. To examine potential differences in information quality, we divide unrealized impairment reversals into three categories of descending reliability:
16 (1) short-term investments and inventory, (2) long-term investments and bad debts, and (3) long-term assets. We then evaluate the valuation consequences of these different reversal items using the following return and price models: 
where RPSP1, RPSP2, and RPSP3 are the three types of reversals per share divided by beginning stock price, and RPS1, RPS2, and RPS3 are the three reversals per share.
The results from both the regular OLS and rank regressions are presented in Table 7 .
(Insert Table 7) For simplicity, we focus on discussing the rank regression results. 17 Both the recurring income and the below-the-line item variables are significantly positive in the return and price models with an expected difference in magnitude between the two variables. In contrast, none of the reversal variables (β 3 , β 4 , or β 5 ) is significant, which suggests that the market does not differentiate among the three types of reversals despite of the potential differences in reliability.
Industry Effect
Considering that some industries report more reversals than others, we examine whether our primary results are affected by industry differences. We first rank industries according to the average of reversals, and then create a dummy variable INDUS taking the value of 1 for companies in one of the top three reversal industries.
As presented in Table 8 , the interaction of INDUS with the reversal variable allows us to examine industry effect.
(Insert Table 8 
Fixed Effect Model
Finally, we estimate a fixed effect model using a balanced sample over the three 17 The regular OLS results are somewhat inconsistent in terms of significant variables and the sign and/or the magnitude of variable coefficients. As discussed earlier, outliers are still a serious concern for the reversal variable.
year period. For total reversals, the fixed effect model includes 2673 observations, while for unrealized reversals, the model includes 1674 observations. The results are basically similar to those presented in Table 5 . For total reversals, both the return and price models using the rank regression produce a significantly positive coefficient for the reversal variable (RPSP = 0.07, p-value = 0.01 in the return model, and RPS = 0.02, p-value = 0.03 in the price model). However, for unrealized reversals, RPSP is insignificantly negative and RPS is positive, but marginally significant with a p-value of 0.1. Consistent with Table 5 , absolute value relevance exists only for total reversals, but not for unrealized reversals. As for relative value relevance, the results are similar but slightly weaker than those reported in Table 5 . For total reversals, we find β 2 (the below-the-line item variable) significantly larger than β 3 (the reversal variable) only in the return model. For unrealized reversals, the value relevance of the three earnings components ranks consistently in the order of β 1 > β 2 > β 3 in both models. Overall, the fixed effect model analysis supports our main findings.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the determinants and consequences of accounting discretion by taking advantage of a unique research opportunity in China. Allowing listed companies to reverse asset impairments, together with a detailed disclosure requirement, provides us with a rich experimental setting to test whether management uses reversal discretion to reveal underlying economics or manage earnings. Based on a sample of companies reporting reversals from 2003 to 2005, we provide the following findings: First, while both economic factors and reporting incentives explain reversals, reporting incentives clearly dominate. Second, although reversal information is reflected in stock valuation, the association of this formation with stock return or price is significantly weaker as compared with other earnings components.
In fact, the magnitude of association is so small that the valuation consequences of impairment reversals almost do not exist economically. Finally and more importantly, any statistically significant valuation consequences for total reversals disappear completely when we examine a sub-sample of unrealized reversals where managerial discretion is higher. Taken together, we conclude that managerial opportunistic behavior may have reduced the reliability of otherwise value-relevant reversal information to such an extent that the usefulness of reversal information is lost.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our findings add another piece of evidence regarding earnings management on expense reversal.
Empirical evidence on expense reversal is extremely rare. Moehrle (2002) finds that U.S. companies reverse restructuring charges to meet or exceed analyst forecasts, and avoid earnings declines or losses. Our study provides more comprehensive evidence including both determinants and consequences. Second, impairment reversals are an important type of accounting discretion in jurisdictions that follow IAS/IFRS. Even for countries such as the U.S. that do no allow unrealized reversals, realized reversals exist through asset disposals. Our study is the first to provide such evidence on this important discretion. Third, this study contributes to the accrual-based earnings management literature through examining a group of identifiable accrual items, i.e., the reversal of asset write-downs. Relatively, our study is less subject to the measurement error associated with the use of the discretionary accrual estimation models (Dechow et al. 1995) .
In addition to enriching the academic literature, our findings have implications for operating income divided by beginning total assets; ST: coded 1 if a firm is specially treated due to reporting losses for two consecutive years, and 0 otherwise; AVST: coded 1 if a firm recognizes a loss for the first time in the previous year, and 0 otherwise; MGT: coded 1 if there is a new board chairman or CEO in the previous year coming from an external source, and 0 otherwise; BATH: coded 1 if write-downs in the previous year exceed the 75th percentile of the industry average, and 0 otherwise; LOSS: the absolute value of loss before reversals or 0 otherwise; DEC: the absolute value of an earnings decline before reversals or 0 otherwise; MOP: coded 1 if a firm receives a modified audit opinion with an explicit explanation that "the auditor is unable to form an opinion on the fairness of asset write-downs due to insufficient audit evidence", and 0 otherwise; FC: coded 1 if earnings before reversals are below the median forecast earnings, and 0 otherwise; LEV: debt to asset ratio; SIZE: the natural logarithm of ending total assets; RETURN: annual stock return from May to April adjusted for the industry median; PRICE: closing stock price on the last trading day of April; FRPSP_O: recurring income per share before reversals divided by the beginning stock price; FRPSP_B: below-the-line earnings per share before a reversal divided by the beginning stock price; FRPS_O: recurring income per share before reversals; FRPS_B: below-the-line earnings per share before reversals; BVPS: net assets per share; RPSP: reversal amount per share divided by the beginning stock price; RPS: reversal amount per share. The model includes 18 industry dummies and 2 year dummies not listed for simplicity. All variables are as defined in Table 3 . 
